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1Introduction
by  MAT ThEW A.  ROSENSTEIN
This issue of Swords and Ploughshares derives its 
content from a symposium held on the University of 
Illinois campus in October 2008, entitled “US-EU-
Russia: New Strategic Dynamics after Bush.” The 
symposium was jointly sponsored by three centers at 
Illinois: the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, 
and International Security (ACDIS), the European 
Union Center, and the Russian, East European, and 
Eurasian Center. This publication was funded primar-
ily through the generous support of the EU Center, 
via its US Department of Education Title VI grant.
As the title indicates, this project sought to 
examine the complex relations among the United 
States, European Union, and Russia at a juncture 
when circumstances suggested such analysis was par-
ticularly warranted—with the conclusion of George 
W. Bush’s eight years as US president, following 
the ascension to the Russian presidency by Dmitry 
Medvedev after Vladimir Putin’s eight years in that 
office (albeit with Putin’s transition to prime minister 
portending a less seismic shift in Russian policy 
direction than the US case signals). These changes 
have implications for the immediate form and tone of 
US-EU-Russia relations. 
In addition to offering a retrospective analysis 
of the post-cold war period and especially the past 
decade, this collection of articles seeks to understand 
and contextualize a series of recent developments 
that have brought the uneasy triangle of relations 
between the US, EU, and Russia into stark relief. 
Those developments include Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February 2008; the August 2008 
Russia-Georgia conflict; US proposals to place missile 
defense systems in the Czech Republic and Poland; 
and ongoing disputes over natural gas that have 
disrupted flows from Russian energy suppliers to 
Ukraine and other countries of Europe. 
The present publication aims to analyze such 
developments within the context of longer-term 
trends, in order to provide insight as to why recent 
events unfolded the way they did, and to offer 
prognoses about the likely course of US-EU-Russia 
interactions in the near future. Individually and 
collectively, the articles contained here also present 
cautionary lessons regarding how the specific policy 
choices and general geopolitical strategies that leaders 
of the US, EU, and Russia pursue could serve to 
improve or exacerbate the recent discord.
In the first article, Professor Roger Kanet begins 
his assessment of current Russian-European relations 
by carefully outlining how the distinctive character-
istics of the Russian Federation and the European 
Union translate into differing decision-making pro-
cesses and policy implementation. Kanet asserts that 
Russia has found it expedient to “ignore the existence 
of the EU” and deal instead with individual member 
states in cases of both cooperation and competi-
tion. he also emphasizes the deteriorating relations 
with the United States since 2002 as significant in 
Russia’s interactions with EU and NATO members. 
Kanet suggests that improved EU-Russian relations 
will be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future, 
given a combination of factors: Russia’s pursuit of a 
more assertive policy on the world stage and within 
its perceived geographic area of “privileged interest;” 
tensions in the transatlantic alliance forged in no 
small part by US unilateralism; deep-seated suspicion 
of Russia’s intentions among newer EU members in 
Central and Eastern Europe; and lack of a coherent 
EU policy with respect to Russia.
Professor Carol Leff focuses the second article on 
the manifestations and consequences of the struggle 
for influence in Eastern Europe between Russia and 
the United States. To illustrate the dynamics of this 
competition, she presents case studies of two ongoing 
geopolitical issues: US efforts to place components of 
a missile defense shield in Polish and Czech territory 
(ostensibly against the threat to Europe from Iranian 
strikes), and Kosovo’s path to independence from 
Serbia, largely through US, NATO, and EU interven-
tion. Leff explains that the missile defense system, 
as a perceived new security threat to Russia, realizes 
Moscow’s worst nightmares about NATO expansion 
into former Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, it has 
had polarizing effects in the domestic political arenas 
of the Czech Republic and Poland, and has divided 
sentiment among America’s Western European allies. 
Leff also argues that—as evidenced by the friction 
surrounding Kosovo’s independence—the issues of 
nationalism, territoriality, and ethnic division in the 
former Yugoslavia were decidedly not put to rest with 
the end of the cold war. She concludes her analysis 
with a set of observations. The first is that a key 
aspect of the cold war mentality—ascribing hostile 
intentions to antagonists and fearing the worst from 
their capabilities—is alive and well. Meanwhile, 
connecting the dots from Kosovo to the Georgian 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
leads her to observe that policymakers would do well 
2to understand that no specific international issue 
exists in isolation from others, and hence every action 
invites a counter-response. 
The third and final contribution, from Dr. Robert 
Brannon, addresses the state of the contemporary 
Russian military and how it enters into the country’s 
overall security calculus. In the conduct of Russia’s 
August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Brannon detects 
the possibility that military opportunism was at 
play. Perceiving that the Russian military may have 
“shaped the political environment” in its preparations 
for invasion, he notes other instances since 1991 that, 
taken together, call into question the nature of Rus-
sia’s civil-military relationship. Brannon also surveys 
the capabilities of Russia’s military today. he views 
a series of obstacles that could hinder attainment of 
Russia’s objective to “return to greatness,” among 
them its creaky military hardware and infrastructure, 
understaffed and archaic defense industry, poorly 
trained soldiers, and fundamental doctrinal con-
tradiction whereby Russia’s military is designed to 
project global great power status but in the foresee-
able future is much more likely to fight skirmishes 
in its own backyard. Even as Brannon acknowledges 
the implications of Russia’s limitations as they pertain 
to US-EU-Russian relations, he notes that Rus-
sia’s capacities to create problems with its neighbors 
and withhold oil and gas from western consumer 
countries are enough to warrant more careful con-
sideration of how Russia fits into the transatlantic 
alliance system, and whether new cooperative security 
paradigms should be explored.
Policymakers would be wise to heed analyses such 
as the ones offered here. A human Rights Watch 
report on the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, 
released just before this issue went to press, cites 
indiscriminate use of force by the involved state 
militaries and local militias alike, and details the casu-
alties from the violent confrontation. Although the 
question of where blame lies for the conflict is likely 
to remain a matter of contention, it is fair to say that 
the accumulation of steps over time by a variety of 
international actors—including the US, EU, and 
Russia—led to a failure of security guarantees for 
the civilians most affected, and such failure came 
at the heaviest price. Meanwhile, as has been made 
clear by the latest round of disputes in early 2009 
over natural gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine and 
EU countries, the lessons from episodes such as the 
Georgia conflict may be slow to gain traction, and 
the multiple issues and tensions described in this col-
lection are therefore likely to frame US-EU-Russian 
relations for some time into the future.
3Short Takes
Russia is a part of European culture. I simply cannot see my country isolated from 
Europe…That is why it is hard for me to regard NATO as an enemy.
—Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister (then-President) of Russia, March 13, 2000
You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. 
If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the 
east.
—US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, January 22, 2003
As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged 
interests.
—Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russia, August 31, 2008
We will not allow Russia to wield a veto over the future of our Euro-Atlantic 
community.
—US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, September 2008
An anti-missile shield won’t be to the benefit of Europe, Russia or anyone else.
—Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, November 14, 2008
Russia is not an enemy.
—US President George W. Bush, June 6, 2007
I think that it is important that we understand they’re not the old Soviet Union, but 
they still have nationalist impulses that I think are very dangerous.
—US President (then-presidential candidate) Barack Obama, October 7, 2008
4Articles
 Despite commitments to 
develop a common foreign 
and defense policy, in no 
way does the European 
Union pursue a common 
policy on issues of central 
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member states.
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process and view the world 
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European political elites.
Russia and Europe: 
An Imbalanced Relationship
by  ROGER E.  KANET
For the past decade and a half the relationship 
between Russia and the European Union has been 
one between two quite different types of political 
entities. On the one hand, Russia was a new political 
actor—though a traditional state and one that had 
inherited a complex set of historical relationships and 
commitments—in the middle stages of economic and 
political freefall. Although Moscow still commanded 
massive nuclear military capabilities, its economic 
and financial situation throughout the 1990s was 
dire. however, since former President Boris Yeltsin’s 
selection of Vladimir Putin as his successor, Russia’s 
fortunes have improved dramatically. In part, this 
resulted from good luck and the escalating demand 
for and price of petroleum and natural gas on the 
world market; in part, it stems from President Putin’s 
successful reimposition of central control over the 
political and economic structures across the vast 
area of the Russian Federation, regardless of the cost 
in terms of human rights and democracy. Russia’s 
resurgence as a major power during the past decade 
has brought with it a reaffirmation of assertiveness 
in its relations with other states—both those within 
its stated sphere of influence and those further from 
Russian territory. The revival of Russia’s economy has 
made such resurgence possible. Russia remains very 
much a traditional power whose leadership views the 
world from a power political perspective, much as 
does US leadership in Washington.
The European Union differs from the Russian 
Federation on virtually all counts. First, and pos-
sibly most important, is the fact that the EU is not 
a state and does not, therefore, have the integrated 
decision-making organs and processes of a state. 
Despite commitments to develop a common foreign 
and defense policy, in no way does the European 
Union pursue a common policy on issues of central 
importance to individual member states, such as the 
nature of relations with the Russian Federation or, for 
that matter, with the United States. The hesitant and 
halting response to the August 2008 Russian military 
intervention in Georgia is but the most recent 
example of the difficulty for the members of the EU 
to agree on a policy when major issues are concerned. 
Is Russia, first and foremost, a looming threat to 
European security, as most of the new members and 
some of the older ones argue, or rather, is Russia to 
be viewed primarily as the solution to Europe’s future 
energy problems, as other member states maintain? 
Moreover, while Russian leaders control a top-down 
decision-making process and view the world largely 
through the realpolitik lens of nineteenth century 
European political elites, many of the members of the 
European Union take a post-modern perspective that 
emphasizes cooperation, negotiation and the peaceful 
resolution of differences, rather than the resort to 
traditional power political approaches to dealing with 
differences. 
We will focus here on those factors that have 
influenced the evolving relationship between the 
Russian Federation and the European Union. It is 
important at the outset to note that this relationship 
is complicated by the fact that Russia has attempted 
to ignore the existence of the EU and has dealt as 
much as possible with individual EU states—as in 
negotiations with Germany, Bulgaria and Italy for 
the construction of gas pipelines under the Baltic 
and Black Seas. In fact, even before the August 2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia, the nature of relations 
with the Russian Federation was a divisive issue 
within the European Union, as new members such as 
Poland and Estonia criticized their EU partners for 
downplaying the importance of a coercive Russian 
policy toward its neighbors in Eastern Europe. Rus-
sia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and ensuing 
diplomatic recognition of the breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia reinforced the fears of 
the new EU members. So, in examining Russian-EU 
relations it is important to recall that in foreign and 
security policy the European Union remains a collec-
tion of sovereign states each of which, especially the 
larger ones, pursues its own relations with Russia.
Added to the complexity that arises from the 
divisions within the EU on the issue of relations 
with Russia, relations between Russia and the United 
States, a formal ally through NATO of most EU 
members, have soured since 2002. On some issues, 
such as the US decision to invade Iraq, Russia joined 
with key US NATO allies to oppose American policy. 
The new, postcommunist, members of the European 
Union have generally been much more supportive 
of US policy and critical of Russia than other EU/
5NATO members have been. In other words, the 
relationships between Russia and the European 
Union have been influenced and further complicated 
by Russian-US and EU-US relations. The current 
analysis deals with five distinct, but overlapping, 
issues: first, the reemergence of a self-confident and 
assertive Russia under former President Vladimir 
Putin, a Russia committed to resuming its role as a 
major world actor; then, the status of the Western 
alliance system and the prospects for the reestablish-
ment of an effective and meaningful transatlantic 
alliance system; third, the prospects for a common 
approach to foreign and security policy in the EU, as 
well as the absorption problems that the EU has faced 
since the expansions of 2004 and 2007 into Central 
Europe; fourth, Russian relations with the European 
Union and its members; and, finally, the deteriora-
tion of relations between the Russian Federation and 
the United States since the short-lived “honeymoon” 
following 9/11, the relevance of which cuts across all 
four of the other issues.  
Before proceeding it is important to note the 
context in which Russian-EU relations have evolved 
for the past decade or so. When President Yeltsin 
appointed Putin as his successor the position of 
the Russian Federation—both domestically and 
internationally—was extremely weak. Russia was 
on the verge of becoming a failed state, one whose 
government was unable to control or administer its 
territory, whose views and interests were ignored 
by other major actors. The Russian economy had 
witnessed serious decline since before the collapse 
of the USSR; the once vaunted Russian military 
proved incapable of winning a conflict with a band 
of secessionists in Chechnya; Moscow was unable to 
collect taxes across much of its huge territory and, 
thus, unable to provide stable incomes to the tens of 
millions of people still on the state payroll; political 
and economic corruption and organized criminal 
activity were widespread. Although the West included 
Russia in some of its important “clubs” (e.g., the 
G-7), they generally ignored Russian objections to 
their policy initiatives—such as NATO expansion, 
NATO military operations against Serbia, etc. This 
was the context in which Vladimir Putin assumed the 
presidency of Russia and laid out a policy aimed at 
recreating Russia’s position as a major international 
power.
The Reemergence of Russia as a Great Power
After assuming the presidency Putin announced his 
commitment to reestablishing Russia’s position as 
the preeminent regional power and as an impor-
tant international actor. To fulfill these objectives 
he had to produce internal political stability and 
economic viability in Russia. Putin moved forcefully, 
and in most cases effectively, in reasserting central 
governmental control in Russia. The economy, while 
still not flourishing, showed strong signs of turning 
around with growth rates of 4.5, 10.0, and 5.0 
percent in the years 1999-2001. The signs of growth 
continued, and even expanded in the following 
years—not merely in the oil and gas sector, but across 
much of the economy. These political and economic 
gains occurred with growing disregard for the civil 
liberties and democratic processes to which Putin’s 
government was nominally committed. his anti-
corruption campaign soon become a catch-all that 
targeted those who in any way challenged his position 
or were concerned about the authoritarian turn in 
Russian politics—such as the independent national 
media, which were largely silenced by the end of 
Putin’s first term as President.
In the foreign policy arena Putin sought allies who 
shared Russia’s commitment to preventing the global 
dominance of the United States that Moscow viewed 
as a threat to international security and to Russia’s 
goal of serving as a major center of influence in a 
multipolar world. Most of the issues on which Russia 
and the United States disagreed in the mid-1990s 
continued to plague that relationship. Until the ter-
rorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 
there was little evidence that the seemingly enduring 
disagreements dividing Russia and the United States 
would disappear soon. In fact, after a brief hiatus 
immediately after 9/11, those issues reemerged and 
continue to plague Russian-US relations.  
however, Putin’s success in dealing with the major 
problems challenging the Russian state at the begin-
ning of the century meant that Russia now could deal 
with Europe and the United States from a position 
of increased strength. That position was enhanced by 
growing European dependence on Russia for energy. 
Besides rebuilding the foundations of the Russian 
state, Putin and his associates benefited from the 
exponential rise in global demand for energy and 
the ensuing revival of the Russian economy. This, 
in turn, contributed to Russia’s ability to pursue a 
much more active and assertive foreign policy. The 
voices calling for Russia to resume its role as a great 
power in the 1990s were strident, but not realistic. 
however, similar voices—led by Vladimir Putin—
have assumed the dominant position in Russia and 
are based upon expectations of achieving many of 
their goals. In a statement to the Russian parliament 
and people Putin noted, “The collapse of the Soviet 
Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
century.” Early in 2007 he delivered a broad attack 
on virtually all aspects of US policy at a security 
conference in Munich that made clear Russia’s new 
assertive approach to foreign policy, beginning with 
its relations with the United States. The rhetoric 
emanating from Moscow at the time of the recent 
military incursion into Georgia confirmed the image 
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6of a revisionist state intent upon reestablishing its 
dominant role, at least along its periphery.
By spring 2008, when Putin turned over the presi-
dency to his successor Dmitry Medvedev, Russia had 
reemerged as a major player in European economic 
and political affairs and as the dominant actor in 
most of post-Soviet space. The foundation of this new 
role is Russia’s semi-monopoly over the extraction 
and distribution of natural gas and oil across much 
of Eurasia, and the growing direct influence that 
this semi-monopoly provides over the economies of 
neighboring states.
The Weakening of the Transatlantic Relationship
Since the turn of the century Russia has successfully 
rebuilt much of its status as a major power and has 
strengthened its overall position in its relationships 
with its near neighbors, a number of emerging states 
in Asia, and much of Europe. For its part, however, 
and despite its overwhelming global military supe-
riority, the political position of the United States in 
Europe—and throughout the world—is significantly 
weaker than it had been a decade ago. An important 
part of its weakened position in world affairs relates 
to the split that has occurred in transatlantic relations 
since the end of the cold war—greatly exacerbated 
since 2001 during the administration of George W. 
Bush by what many Europeans view as a hegemonic 
and unilateralist approach to policy making, most 
clearly visible in the run-up to the US invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. The current divisions in the transatlan-
tic relationship are far more consequential than dis-
agreements in the past and will not likely be resolved 
to the point where they can be completely healed. 
Serious disagreements will characterize future rela-
tions in which institutional linkages will be loosened. 
Although the tone of relations between the major 
European states and Washington improved during 
the second Bush Administration, important policy 
differences—from those concerning the ongoing wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan to how to deal with global 
warming—continue to plague the relationship. The 
question of how to respond to Russia and to Russia’s 
often confrontational policy initiatives has been 
added to the list of other important differences on 
issues ranging from growing European dependence 
on Russian energy exports to Russia’s bullying tactics 
and pressure against Estonia, Ukraine and Georgia—
even after the August 2008 Russian invasion of 
Georgia.
The EU in Search of a Policy
After more than a decade of deepening and broaden-
ing integration in Europe, recently the European 
Union has seemingly lost some of its raison d’être. 
The defeat of the proposed constitution in 2005 
by voters in France and the Netherlands and the 
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Irish voters in 
spring 2008 created a constitutional crisis in the 
EU. The political mechanisms established half a 
century ago for decision making by a community 
of half a dozen members no longer work effectively 
for a union of twenty-seven members. Yet, coming 
up with a solution to the problem has, to date, been 
beyond the capability of the leadership of the EU. 
Added to this is the fact that national governments 
across Europe simply have not been able to replace 
their conceptions of individual national interest 
with supranational, or EU, interests. The common 
foreign and security policy to which the EU com-
mitted itself a decade and a half ago appears no 
closer to realization on major issues in 2008 than it 
was a decade ago. The differential responses of the 
countries of Europe to the US decision to overthrow 
Saddam hussein’s regime in Iraq provide an excellent 
illustration of the lack of a common sense of EU 
interest and the absence of anything approximating a 
common policy. The nature of relations with Russia 
has become another source of division among the 
member countries of the European Union. While 
“older” members seem more interested in normal-
izing relations with the Russian Federation and in 
ensuring their long-term energy supplies, the new 
members are more troubled about the suppression 
of dissent in post-Soviet states and about Russian 
domination over neighboring states, in part by using 
the “energy weapon” to blackmail those countries 
dependent on Russian supplies of gas and oil. For 
political elites in Central Europe and the Baltics, Rus-
sia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 
and its ensuing recognition of breakaway regions in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia provide evidence of its 
continuing threat to national security throughout 
the region. For purposes of the present analysis the 
most important issue concerning the EU and its 
general foreign and security policy is the fact that no 
common EU foreign policy exists, rhetoric about a 
common foreign and security policy notwithstand-
ing. All of this means that Russia—and the United 
States, for that matter—does not deal with a large 
and integrated Europe, but rather is able to pursue 
policies targeted at individual European states.
Russia and the European Union
Throughout the history of the European Commu-
nity and European Union, the Soviet Union and 
the Russian Federation have, in effect, attempted to 
ignore the emergence of the multinational institu-
tion as a collective decision-making organization 
in favor of dealing individually and bilaterally with 
member states. Given the absence of a full commit-
ment on the part of the EU’s members to collective 
decision making in the areas of foreign and security 
policy—and, at times, even in trade and economic 
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7policy—the approach has generally been rather suc-
cessful for the Russians. Yet, over the past decade the 
EU has also pursued a broad range of agreements and 
relations with the Russian Federation. At times, the 
EU and other West European political institutions 
have been extremely critical of Russian domestic and 
foreign policy behavior on issues as wide-ranging as 
Russia’s brutal treatment of Chechen separatists, the 
suppression of domestic dissent, support for seces-
sionist movements in neighboring states, the use of 
gas and oil deliveries as a blackmail tool, and related 
matters. Prior to the June 2008 EU-Russian summit 
two clear camps had emerged within the European 
Union on the issue of relations with Russia—the 
military incursion into Georgia in August reinforced 
those positions. On the one side were, especially, 
the new member states—led by Poland and Estonia. 
Allied with them at times and on some issues were 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. For the Central 
European states recent Russian treatment of Georgia 
and Estonia, even before the August 2008 inva-
sion of the former, as well as continuing support 
for secessionist groups in post-Soviet countries, 
was reminiscent of almost half a century of Soviet 
domination throughout the region. Sweden reacted 
especially to Russia’s treatment of Georgia even prior 
to the military incursion, while the UK has raised all 
these issues, besides Russia’s reported involvement in 
the 2006 murder of an ex-Russian security officer in 
London. On the other hand, important EU members 
are committed to normalizing relations with Russia, 
in particular concerning the import of energy.  
Russian Energy and EU Political Divisions • The 
divisions in Europe’s responses to Russian policy 
have emerged and widened since 2000—at the very 
time that European states have sought long-term 
solutions to dependence on imports of energy. Just 
as important, however, as the turn to Russia by some 
of the EU states for energy supplies has been the 
expansion of EU membership since 2004, with nine 
of the 12 new members having experienced almost 
half a century of Soviet domination after the Second 
World War. Perhaps the most important disagree-
ment concerns the growing dependence of Europe on 
energy supplied by the Russian Federation. More-
over, the United States has been an active player in 
attempts to contain Russia’s growing control over the 
development and distribution of oil and gas from 
Eurasia destined for Central and Western Europe. 
Washington has led efforts to develop pipelines 
for the distribution to Europe of gas and oil from 
Central Asia that will avoid Russian territory and, 
perhaps, Russian influence or control. This policy has 
been driven by the justified concern in Washington 
that Russia’s influence in Europe would be enhanced 
were Moscow to control the distribution of Central 
Asian gas and oil, as well as its own. The Russians, 
understandably, have viewed this US approach—
especially in conjunction with the eastward expan-
sion of NATO—as a continuation of the cold war 
policy of containment. US efforts to restrict Russian 
influence over the delivery of energy to Europe have 
failed to accomplish their objectives; Russia has 
effectively outmaneuvered the United States in its 
relations with the oil and gas producing countries 
of Central Asia, even though several pipelines have 
been completed that skirt Russian territory. In recent 
years Moscow has reestablished solid political and 
economic relations with the authoritarian regimes of 
Central Asia. It has signed new agreements with these 
energy producers that will expand the supplies of gas 
and oil destined for European consumers through the 
existing and planned pipeline network across Russian 
territory, as part of an apparent Russian effort to 
increase control over the oil and gas that flow from 
Eurasia to Europe.  
Especially important for the current argument is 
Russia’s agreement with important Western partners 
for the future distribution of oil and gas to Europe, 
which will eliminate the possible interference of 
current transit states such as Ukraine, Belarus and 
Poland, by avoiding their territory altogether. The 
planned Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines 
under the Baltic Sea and Black Sea directly to 
Germany and Bulgaria will expand Russia’s domina-
tion over the gas markets of Europe, while reducing 
possible disruption of those flows. Overall, Russia has 
positioned itself effectively to control the production 
and distribution of energy across almost all former 
Soviet space as part of former President Putin’s com-
mitment to establish Russia as a major global actor. 
The dependence on external sources for virtually all 
gas and oil needs of some countries in the European 
Union and their willingness to cut bilateral deals with 
Russia outside the context of a common EU policy 
(notably Germany, Bulgaria and Italy), has aided 
Russia in its attempt to employ energy as a foreign 
policy tool. Poland has been especially critical of 
the Russian-German pipeline agreement as part of 
its overall criticism of Russian policy, as has Wash-
ington. The Poles were especially angered by what 
they viewed as Germany’s willingness to capitulate 
to Russia, while the latter exerted unacceptably 
hostile pressures on EU member states. The accession 
to the EU of the postcommunist states of Central 
Europe and the Baltics has added a new dimension 
to Russian-EU relations, a dimension that was hardly 
considered in the run-up to their admission in 2004 
and 2007.
War in Georgia, “Frozen Conflicts,” the “Color 
Revolutions” and Human Rights • EU members 
also disagree among themselves on the importance 
of a series of issues regarding Russia’s relations with 
its new neighbors, as well as human rights abuses in 
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8Russia itself. The “frozen conflicts” about which new 
EU members have been most agitated relate to the 
Transdniestria region of Moldova, Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, and especially the two breakaway regions of 
Georgia—South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The issue of 
Russian support for secessionist forces in several post-
communist states, not to speak of the direct military 
intervention in Georgia in support of such forces, 
resonates strongly among new EU members, as does 
Russian economic pressure against neighboring states 
on numerous occasions since the collapse of the 
former USSR, but especially during the presidency 
of Vladimir Putin. Moscow has shown its willingness 
to impose severe economic pressures—especially by 
shutting off the supply of natural gas and oil—to 
strengthen its bargaining position in economic and 
political disputes with countries such as Ukraine, 
Georgia, Belarus, and Estonia. It has been this will-
ingness to coerce and bully small neighbors that has 
revived serious fears among new EU members—most 
former dependents of the Soviet Union—about the 
prospects for their longer-term security in the face of 
an increasingly assertive Russia. Poland and Lithuania 
used their “veto” power to prevent the negotiation of 
a new partnership agreement between the EU and 
Russia for more than a year and a half. At a joint 
meeting between the EU and Russia in May 2007, 
these and other issues split the two sides and pre-
cluded any meaningful agreement even on other less 
controversial issues deemed important by either side. 
Meanwhile, the unwillingness of the major states of 
Western Europe to support their new EU partners 
fully and effectively continues to provide an opening 
for the United States, whose views of Russia and 
Russian policy are much closer to those of countries 
such as Poland and the Baltic states.
Related to the issue of “frozen conflicts” is that 
of the so-called color revolutions (the 2003 Orange 
Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Rose Revolution 
in Ukraine) that brought to power Western-oriented 
and proto-democratic political regimes. In both of 
these cases, as also in Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution 
(2005), Moscow opposed the change in political 
forces that reduced its ability to reestablish its politi-
cal dominance in a “Greater Russia.” In both Georgia 
and Ukraine the relationship with Russia has been 
conflictual ever since the shift in domestic politi-
cal power. As already noted, one result was Russia’s 
attempt to use its economic leverage, especially its 
control over energy, to influence the policies of both 
countries. For the new members of the European 
Union, these and related matters are of great security 
concern, while for the countries of Western Europe 
they are of secondary importance to the immediate 
and longer-term needs to normalize relations with the 
Russian Federation and to ensure energy supplies for 
the future. 
NATO Expansion, US Missile Defense, and Ex-
Yugoslavia • Besides the issues of energy dependence, 
“frozen conflicts,” and Russia’s assertive role towards 
neighboring states, other important matters cloud 
Russian relations with the West and divide EU 
member states concerning the appropriate response to 
be taken in any given situation. Since the mid-1990s 
NATO expansion eastward has elicited strong opposi-
tion from Russia, which views it as a breach of agree-
ments reached between the USSR and the West at 
the time of German reunification and as a direct chal-
lenge to Russian security in what Moscow perceives 
as its legitimate sphere of influence. Although the 
United States was the driving force for expansion in 
1997 and 2004 and remains the primary advocate for 
the admission of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, 
long-term European members have been lukewarm 
or even opposed to further expansion eastward. Yet, 
on this issue as well, the position of the new members 
of the European Union and NATO differs from that 
of their western EU partners. Virtually all of them 
joined NATO as a means not only to be accepted 
into one of the core Western “clubs,” but also in 
the expectation of enhancing their security. They 
view the inclusion of countries such as Ukraine and 
Georgia into NATO as a strengthening of their own 
long-term security situation vis-à-vis Russia. Russia, 
for its part, continues to make clear that further 
movement of NATO eastward would elicit a very 
negative response. In his new role as Russian prime 
minister, Vladimir Putin has threatened to terminate 
Russia’s “military and other contracts with Ukrainian 
weapons and space facilities that depend on Moscow, 
if Ukraine joins the Western defense alliance.” Yet, 
as has become clear on a broad range of issues, the 
divisions within NATO and the EU permit Moscow 
to exploit divisions within the Western community in 
order to accomplish its own objectives.  
If anything, the US decision to place elements 
of its planned missile defense system in the Czech 
Republic and Poland has generated even more fierce 
opposition in Moscow than have plans for further 
expansion of NATO membership. At every stage 
in the emerging agreements between Washington 
and its Polish and Czech allies the Russians have 
threatened to respond—most recently with “military 
resources.” President Medvedev has emphasized that 
the Russian position on this issue has not shifted 
with the change in presidents by stating to a group 
of high-level Russian diplomats: “The deployment of 
elements of the US global missile defense system in 
Eastern Europe is only aggravating the situation. We 
will have to respond appropriately and our American 
and European partners have already been warned.” 
Western policy toward ex-Yugoslavia, in particular 
the widespread support for and recognition of the 
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9new state of Kosovo, has also elicited serious Russian 
opposition and has, in effect, provided Russia with 
the justification for recognition of the independence 
of the secessionist regions that they have supported 
throughout the post-Soviet period—i.e., especially 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria. On the 
issue of Kosovo’s independence the members of the 
EU and NATO have been far less divided than they 
have been on growing European energy dependence 
on Russia, NATO expansion, or US missile defense. 
Yet, even here important countries such as Spain, 
which faces domestic demands for independence, 
have taken a separate approach.
Prospects for Future Relations
As should be clear at this point in the argument 
presented here, the European Union lacks a coherent 
policy in its relations with Russia. Moreover, because 
US policy toward the Russian Federation since the 
end of the cold war has been based, in part at least, 
on containing Moscow’s influence, US policy impacts 
directly on the divisions within the European Union 
between those who recommend patience and caution 
in dealing with Russia, such as Germany, and those 
who focus on what they view as aggressive behavior 
toward neighboring states.  
The EU-Russian summit held near Samara, 
Russia, in May 2007 proved to be a total failure, as 
both sides exchanged charges against one another. 
From then to mid-2008, however, the EU as an 
organization seemed to back off from its rather stron-
ger approach to Russia. The mood of key European 
leaders at the June 2008 summit was much more 
upbeat, as they seemed willing to give new Russian 
President Medvedev the benefit of the doubt. Yet, 
the “charm offensive” of President Medvedev hardly 
resolved the outstanding issues between Russia and 
members of the EU—in particular the new members 
who view the Russian Federation through the lens of 
almost half a century of Soviet domination. More-
over, Russia and the EU have quite different concep-
tions of the nature of a new agreement to frame their 
relations. The European Union prefers an Agreement 
on Partnership and Cooperation that spells out 
in detail the terms of agreement across economic, 
energy, and political matters, while Russia proposes a 
much narrower framework agreement that relegates 
specifics to later follow-on agreements. Although the 
meeting in late June 2008 was much more cordial 
than that a year earlier, the central issues that divide 
the two persisted, such as the demands placed on 
Russia by the EU as a precondition for visa-free travel 
between Russia and the EU. When one adds these 
differences plus the continuing concerns of new EU 
member states, often supported by the United States, 
to the fact that any new agreement between the EU 
and Russia requires the approval of all twenty-seven 
members, one can come to the conclusion that the 
road to a new Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment will not be smooth and will depend on shifts 
in perception about longer-term Russian intentions 
among the new members of the European Union. 
Furthermore, the development of the Russian-EU 
relationship was interrupted by Moscow’s invasion 
of Georgia. As a group, the EU members’ reaction 
was moderate and measured, although the United 
States and the newer members of the organization 
pushed for more forceful retaliatory action. The 
EU called upon Russia to withdraw from Georgian 
territory and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, 
in his role as head of the EU’s rotating presidency, 
played a key role in negotiating that withdrawal and 
the agreements to replace Russian “peacekeepers” in 
Georgia proper with EU observers. The only “sanc-
tions” imposed on Russia were an indefinite delay in 
discussing the nature of any future formal Russian-
EU relationship. however, after months of domestic 
debate both Poland and the Czech Republic finalized 
agreements with the United States for the construc-
tion of radar and missile installations as part of the 
US anti-missile program and were among those 
calling for a forceful EU response to Russian actions.   
The prospects for a rapid improvement in EU-
Russian relations are not positive, given Russia’s 
occupation of parts of Georgian territory, President 
Medvedev’s claim that former Soviet space is an area 
of “privileged interest,” and, on the other side, the 
renewed insistence of the EU’s newer members, sup-
ported by the United States, that Russia represents 
more a security threat than a solution to Europe’s 
problems. Even in Europe the “new world order” 
touted in the early 1990s appears to have had a brief 
existence.
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With the collapse of communism, the “return to 
Europe”—a Europe of transnational institutions—
was a clear priority for the former communist bloc 
states, anxious to exchange the security and politi-
cal system of the East for the democratic capitalist 
security system of the West. In this objective, most 
of Eastern Europe had succeeded by 2008, joining 
the NATO and EU structures that embedded them 
in the network of Western institutions. Negotiations 
continued on the status of the Western Balkans. 
however, the geometry of power in the region was of 
course more complex than a simple change of align-
ment. Although the states of Eastern Europe arguably 
faced the most favorable security environment in 
their modern independent histories, the geopolitical 
position was still that of a border zone, marking the 
outer boundaries of both NATO and the European 
Union. Negotiating the new order continued to place 
the region between east and west, between Russia and 
the amalgam of western states with a far from coher-
ent and uniform foreign policy orientation.
In this analysis, I will explore two ongoing 
episodes that epitomize the cross-regional tensions of 
the new order as it plays out in Eastern and Central 
Europe: the emergence of the independent state of 
Kosovo and the American pursuit of a missile shield 
program based in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
These cases differ in essential respects—Kosovo is first 
of all a problem internal to the region, and the missile 
shield is an external project—but what they have in 
common is that both are exercises in international 
problem solving on the part of the West from which 
Russia has felt largely excluded. Both therefore 
represent a culmination of a post-communist history 
in which Russia has felt systematically disregarded or 
rebuffed in its bid to play a central role in managing 
the post-cold war order. Each issue also reflects differ-
ences in the postures and priorities of Western actors. 
But the interlocking puzzle pieces nonetheless create 
a clearer picture of Russian security thinking and the 
ways in which Western actions have shaped Russian 
responses across a range of issues that at first sight do 
not appear directly related.
Before examining the two cases, it is useful to 
contextualize them as part of a pattern of accumulat-
ing Russian grievances, the most resonant of which 
deal with EU/NATO activities in Russia’s backyard, 
or its sphere of influence. From the Russian vantage 
point, Russia was being asked to countenance NATO 
expansion, even into former Soviet territory, the 
withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty, 
the dismantling of the former Yugoslavia without 
reference to Serbian wishes and security concerns 
(and the lopsided attribution of blame for war crimes 
to the Serbian state), the bombing campaigns of 
1995 and 1999 in Bosnia and Serbia respectively, and 
United States-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Russian leaders have expressed increasing resentment 
at a unipolar world in which US unilateral action and 
its selective application of international law was either 
supported by EU states or fruitlessly opposed by 
them, and in which legitimate Russian security con-
cerns, as well as its status as a serious global power, 
were consistently disregarded. 
This perception of the Western posture has 
profoundly influenced post-communist foreign rela-
tions. Most recently, President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
presentation of Russia’s foreign policy objectives (the 
so-called Medvedev doctrine of September 2008) 
puts multipolarity in pride of place second only to 
observance of international law as a fundamental 
principle of Russian international relations. The fifth 
and final point claimed “regions in which Russia has 
privileged interests”—a territory defined in terms of 
“special historical relations” and clearly referring to 
the former Soviet Union in particular, but broadly 
enough defined to extend to Eastern Europe as well. 
As we will see, both these affirmative objectives, and 
the underlying reservations about Western projects 
that can be inferred from them, are interwoven in 
the Russian response to most key issues that have 
emerged in framing the post-cold war architecture. 
The Missile Defense Shield: Whose Backyard?
As part of the broader program to provide a global 
missile defense shield against rogue states, the Bush 
administration courted the Czech and Polish govern-
ments to gain their agreement to host components 
of the shield project. The proposal was for a missile 
interceptor base in northern Poland and a missile-
tracking radar base in the Brdy military district 
southwest of Prague in the Czech Republic (in 
Europe at large, upgraded radar bases in UK and 
Greenland are also in progress). Positioning the anti-
missile defense project on Czech and Polish territory, 
it was argued, would help to block any missile threat 
from Iran. Pending full approval by the two countries 
and continued support by the Obama administra-
tion, the shield is scheduled for deployment in 2012.
Attempting to further one global objective, 
however, can jeopardize others, as the political 
fall-out from the missile shield controversy clearly 
shows. In the first place, the initiative was wildly 
unpopular with the Czech and Polish publics, who 
feared a range of consequences from damage to 
health to Russian over-reaction to the attraction of 
terrorist attention. Depending on the wording of the 
survey question, between 55 and 70 percent of the 
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populations responded negatively to the proposal. 
The Czechs were particularly unhappy with the siting 
of a base in a military district formerly used by Soviet 
troops, and therefore emblematic of foreign occupa-
tion of Czech territory. 
The Czech mobilization to challenge the radar 
base was particularly sustained; it involved wide-
spread local referendums against the plan and an 
active “No to Bases” movement that repeatedly pro-
tested at the Brdy site and in major Czech cities. The 
condescending government stance—characterizing 
the radar base as a “technical matter” for parliament 
and not a cause offering the young something to rebel 
against—has trivialized the widely felt resistance. 
Interestingly, Poles and Czechs responded quite dif-
ferently to the Russia-Georgia crisis in August 2008. 
Whereas Czech opposition to the radar base remained 
largely unchanged, Polish public opinion turned 
defiant, and 60 percent opposition to the missile 
shield emplacement turned to 60 percent support 
virtually overnight.
The early popular antagonism to the plan created 
a political dilemma for both governments, neither 
of which had strong parliamentary majorities. In 
the Czech case, indeed, the microscopic majority 
was attained only six months after an election that 
split the chamber down the middle and necessitated 
the wooing of opposition deputies to win an initial 
vote of confidence (it is now a minority govern-
ment). In short, the American move traded off the 
missile shield plan against the political headaches of 
their NATO allies, without much attention to those 
consequences. Both governments have approved their 
respective projects, but each awaits the decision of 
the incoming Obama administration before submit-
ting the agreements to what will certainly be nasty 
parliamentary ratification debates, especially in the 
Czech case, where it isn’t clear that parliament will 
even approve. The Polish government now holds a 
commanding majority on the issue, in part thanks 
to Russian threats, but can expect resistance and 
demands for a referendum from the left opposition.
The West in general is divided on the issue as 
well, with the EU failing to take a supportive stand 
at the July 2008 summit; French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, whose country held the EU presidency 
at the time, spoke after an EU-Russian meeting in 
November 2008 to argue that the missile shield does 
not advance security and only makes things more 
complicated. 
A dead cat? • For Russia, the missile defense system 
has been exactly the nightmare evoked by the expan-
sion of NATO into the former Soviet bloc: a buffer 
zone turned into a security threat. Russian protests 
greeted the first American overtures to Poland and 
the Czech Republic (and the US suggestion that 
Russian monitors might be present at the installation 
sites in turn drew horrified responses from Poles and 
Czechs). As the negotiations reached fruition, Russia 
has responded on both military and diplomatic 
fronts, refusing to accept the American position that 
the East European components of the shield are only 
directed at Iran. Energy deliveries to Prague were 
mysteriously though briefly suspended immediately 
after the Czech signing of the radar agreement in July 
2008. Russian NATO envoy Dmitry Rogovin was 
even more vehement following the Polish govern-
ment’s signature in August 2008: “Such action 
cannot go unpunished…The fact that this was signed 
in a period of very difficult crisis in the relations 
between Russia and the United States over the situ-
ation in Georgia shows that, of course, the missile 
defense system will be deployed not against Iran but 
against the strategic potential of Russia.” he added, 
“The Europeans have received a ‘dead cat’ from the 
Americans.” 
More dramatically, Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, 
deputy chief of staff of Russia’s armed forces warned: 
“Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself 
to a strike—100 percent.” The commander of the 
Russian strategic forces noted that both Polish and 
Czech facilities could be designated as ICBM targets. 
In November 2008, Russia specifically threatened to 
position missiles in Kaliningrad, directly adjoining 
the Polish missile shield. On November 26, 2008, 
Russia conducted another round of its test firing 
of the new RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile, 
slated for deployment in late 2009 and engineered to 
“counter air defense systems like the controversial US 
missile shield.” Russian officials have described both 
of these moves as a response to the Bush adminis-
tration program; they may also serve as bargaining 
chips, since Vladimir Putin has been explicit that the 
Kaliningrad plan in particular could be scrapped if 
Barack Obama drops the initiative in Central Europe. 
Thus the extension of the controversial missile 
shield project, whether or not it could enhance secu-
rity against hypothetical Iranian missiles, has raised 
new security issues in the European context, divided 
populations and alliances and provoked an aggressive 
Russian response. 
Kosovo connection 1999–2008
If the missile shield controversy can be understood 
as the culmination of Russian concerns about the 
meaning of NATO expansion, then Kosovo can 
be seen as the touchstone of Russian objections to 
Western map-making through intervention. The 
Albanian enclave of Kosovo within Serbia was first 
to be projected as a flashpoint and virtually last to 
explode in the sequence of Yugoslav wars of suc-
cession of the 1990s. Embedded as autonomous 
territory within Serbia that Slobodan Milosevic sum-
marily dissolved, Kosovo Albanian elites listened for 
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years as Western leaders counseled patience. Tensions 
only accelerated after the 1995 Dayton agreement 
failed to address the Kosovo question, exploding 
in 1998 into massive Albanian refugee flows and a 
territorial crisis that international mediation efforts 
failed to resolve. 
Although Russia had repeatedly protested 
Western decision-making during the successive 
Yugoslav crises, Kosovo was to become the center-
piece of Russian disavowal of Western projects and a 
fundamental reference point for Russian resentment 
of unilateral Western decision-making that paid lip 
service to a Russian partner without seriously attend-
ing to Russian concerns. The Clinton administration’s 
orchestration of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign 
created conditions that effectively transferred Kosovo 
from Serbian administration to a UN mandate that 
the Russian government had to tolerate as a fait 
accompli. The whole process nonetheless met with 
Moscow’s vigorous protests and its own independent 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kosovo dilemma. 
Despite Russian engagement in the peacekeeping and 
mediation process, Russian spokesmen continued to 
challenge the way western forces had both defined the 
issues surrounding Kosovo’s status and set the accept-
able parameters for agreement. 
The highest pitch of outrage, of course, occurred 
after the breakdown of negotiations over Kosovo’s fate 
in 2007 and general western recognition of the sub-
sequent unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s indepen-
dence in February 2008. Russian politicians termed 
this response a violation of international law that 
detached territory from Serbia without its consent. 
More pungently, the Russian government decried a 
precedent that would generate “a storm of separat-
ism” globally. The Kosovar independence declaration 
had explicitly disavowed any broader relevance for 
its own claim to statehood: “Kosovo is a special case 
arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and 
is not a precedent for any other situation.” however, 
neither the Russians nor other nervous multi-ethnic 
states found that proviso reassuring.
In fact, support for Kosovo’s independence was 
not unanimous in Europe. Countries withholding 
recognition were those that faced their own politi-
cally relevant minorities: Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Spain. Greece also balked at anything that might set a 
precedent for Cyprus. Nonetheless, unlike the missile 
shield controversy, the EU in this case was an active 
player and a direct target of Russian criticism because 
of its projected position as coordinating power 
under the so-called “EULex” rule of law mission that 
was slated to operate under UN mandate in post-
independence Kosovo. Insisting on a continuation of 
the UN-mandated UNMIK mission led by NATO, 
Russia blocked the EULex initiative, leaving the 
project in legal limbo for most of 2008. Some verbal 
and organizational acrobatics have now generated a 
“reconfigured” program that includes US participa-
tion and a partial revision of the program itself. 
The most consequential outgrowth of this dispute, 
however, did not relate to Kosovo itself, but rather in 
the Georgian-Russian confrontation over the status of 
the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Russian analysts had described acceptance 
of Kosovo’s independence as a Western betrayal that 
freed Russia from constraints on its own policies 
within the former Soviet Union. Interviewed by the 
Christian Science Monitor on February 20, 2008, 
nationalist intellectual Alexander Dugin reflected 
widespread Russian opinion in saying: “The Kosovo 
situation shows us with complete clarity that the 
geopolitical interests of Russia and the West are in 
fundamental conflict…geopolitical interests now 
prevail. Any talk of morality is just a disguise.” he 
prophetically argued, “Russia should regard this as an 
opportunity to enlarge its own zone of influence,” by 
recognizing statelets like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Indeed, the Russian Foreign Ministry had already 
issued a statement saying, “Proclamation and recogni-
tion of Kosovo’s independence will certainly have to 
be considered in connection with the situation in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” 
hence Georgia’s attempts to reassert control in 
South Ossetia in August 2008 triggered a Russian 
response that included vigorous military action and 
official recognition of both South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian independence, as was prefigured months 
earlier. Indeed, President Medvedev made the link 
very explicit in his announcement of Russian recogni-
tion in late August, saying that he felt “obliged to rec-
ognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as other countries 
had done with Kosovo.”
The Kosovo situation undoubtedly lacked a solu-
tion that could satisfy all parties. What is evident in 
this case, however, as in the case of the missile shield, 
is that the attempt to solve this problem had ricochet 
effects internationally that went well beyond the 
immediate geopolitical context and created tensions 
within and across alliance boundaries. 
Lessons unlearned?
Let me now address the question that became a 
central part of the American debates surrounding 
both the missile shield project and the Kosovo prec-
edent, particularly as it applies to Russian recognition 
of the Georgian secessionist regions. That is the ques-
tion of whether Russian objections and actions have 
been based on security concerns sincerely harbored by 
the key Russian policy-makers, or are rather merely 
rhetorical devices to justify actions that suit Russian 
policy objectives of the moment. how artificial, in 
short, are the Russian responses to western actions in 
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these cases? This is not a resolvable issue, but some 
points can be made. 
First, the official US posture has generally been 
to discount the underlying concerns expressed by the 
Russian leadership as a misunderstanding of Ameri-
can policy motives. In fact, it might be well to rec-
ognize that although the classic cold war is over, we 
have not left behind a central feature of that period. 
That feature is the kind of elite mirror-imaging that 
focuses on the antagonists’ actions in the context of 
their capabilities and fears the worst, while viewing 
one’s own actions in the context of one’s motivations 
and expecting those motivations to be accepted at 
face value. hence in the case of the missile shield, 
and NATO expansion as a whole, the United States 
and some of its allies see a peace and stability project 
based on intentions, and Russia sees the capability of 
that project to turn against the Russian state. While 
individual responses may indeed be disingenuous, 
there is little doubt of the broader sense in which 
Russians have felt their security and significance 
erode over the past decade, and the resonance that 
Putin and now Medvedev find in taking stances that 
redress the balance. Western policy-makers have to 
take that context into account in actions that affect 
Russian perceptions of their strategic position.
The debate over the Kosovo precedent raises a 
second issue. Many pundits and public intellectu-
als in the United States scorned Russia’s use of the 
Kosovo case to validate its own recognition of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the same time, one has to 
bear in mind that this kind of response—if not the 
specific instance—was both predictable and predicted 
in the aftermath of Western recognition of Kosovo. 
Many international voices depicted it as opening a 
“Pandora’s box,” setting a “terrible” and “dangerous” 
precedent that was sure to backfire. In fact, what is at 
issue here is not Russian behavior or Western inten-
tions, but a basic underlying contradiction that has 
been with us at least since World War I—the tension 
between the norms of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity on the one hand, and national self-determi-
nation on the other. In a broader historical context, 
then, the collapse of communism ended a kind of 
international moratorium on new state creation since 
the end of decolonization. The three communist 
federations—Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak—
dissolved and it still isn’t clear how far the ramifica-
tions of those dissolutions will extend. 
Finally, if these case studies tell us anything, it is 
that individual policy decisions cannot be narrowly 
framed in terms of specific objectives and cordoned 
off from other international issues. That simply isn’t 
possible. To make a single policy choice is to play a 
multi-dimensional game in which security choices 
designed to resolve one issue resonate through the 
entire web of international relationships. 
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There is a lot of talk these days about what the US 
and Europe should do about Russia—as if Russia 
were something we should actually do something 
about. There is too much hype on both sides of the 
argument—too much empty rhetoric on Russia’s part 
and too much hand-wringing on the part of Europe 
and the United States about the possibilities that 
there could be a new “cold war.” The truth is there is 
no such thing—neither side wants a new confronta-
tion of that kind—but we seem to have returned to 
a condition where each side refers to the other as if it 
were something with which to be coped.
America is embarking upon a new era in inter-
national relations and Russia will almost certainly 
play a significant role. Relations with Russia are 
currently set on a difficult course, one might even say 
the two sides are worlds apart. Well-known author 
and scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center Dmitri 
Trenin recently described his country as a paradox, 
claiming that Russia feels itself to be in a state of 
profound geo-political solitude. Despite all of its 
efforts to be European—to be in the club—Russia 
still finds itself to be outside the mainstream. Most 
security organizations today are legacies of the cold 
war—Russia is by default either excluded or margin-
alized. If we fail to find common ground in the area 
of international security Russia will likely continue to 
take risks in ever greater efforts to achieve credibil-
ity—risks the West can ill afford to tolerate.
European security is oriented toward maximizing 
strengths and minimizing weaknesses—collective 
arrangements work best. Russian security is essen-
tially security of the state and its markets. It is 
difficult to explain to Russia why so many European 
countries need collective security when there is no 
apparent contemporary state-centric threat. Although 
recent indications point toward a much more broad-
based approach to Russia’s national security strategy 
and foreign policy, nothing concrete has yet changed 
that perception. Europe and the United States are 
seemingly happy with their old alliances, arrange-
ments that have served them well and have stood the 
test of time. Russia has no stake in this approach. 
Other than its permanent membership on the UN 
Security Council, the Soviet legacy does not grant 
Russia any advantages that might be seen as strong or 
influential. Surely there must be a new arrangement 
that would allow Russia to have a more equal role in 
international security affairs, without giving it a veto 
over the security interests of other states.
While it may be accurate to say, as is currently 
popular, that “Russia is back,” it is also useful, and 
probably more accurate, to consider Russia’s new 
and aggressive foreign and security policies in light 
of what it has and what it can really do. This article 
is about Russia’s military instrument of power. It 
examines civil-military relations from the standpoint 
of capabilities and intent—how it is used in support 
of foreign policy and security. 
Civil-Military Relations and Military 
Opportunism in Russia 
Shortly before the Soviet Union collapsed, in August 
1991, the Russian military was complicit in an 
attempt to seize power while then President Mikhail 
Gorbachev was away. The attempt failed. While I do 
not contend that the army in Russia has an inclina-
tion to take power in a coup, I am suggesting that 
there is a pattern of evidence that civilians may not be 
able to exercise full authority over the military; and 
that bad things in Russia often happen in August.
Last summer, in August 2008, the Russian Army 
deployed troops and equipment, mostly tanks and 
armored personnel carriers, to its southern flank on 
the border with Georgia, immediately adjacent to 
the region known as South Ossetia (North Ossetia 
is actually inside the Russian Federation). At the 
conclusion of the exercises, most of the force did 
not redeploy to its home base, as is usually the case 
in such maneuvers. Instead, troops and supplies 
remained stationed—provocatively—on the border. 
Weeks later, when Georgia acted (perhaps rashly) to 
defend its sovereignty against increasingly aggressive 
Russian peacekeepers inside South Ossetia (part of 
Georgia), these troops moved into positions inside 
Georgian territory via the two and one half mile long 
Roki Tunnel. There is also additional evidence that 
the Russian military acted on its own to set the stage 
for war.
In the weeks that followed the world watched 
in horror as Russian tanks and armored personnel 
carriers brought troops and various other heavily 
armed forces deep inside Georgian territory in a 
well orchestrated military operation. Casualties on 
both sides mounted quickly. Shortly after the initial 
actions in South Ossetia Russia intervened further, 
into Abkhazia, another of Georgia’s regions with a 
majority population of ethnic Russians. Claiming 
its actions were entirely supportable in defense of its 
own citizens, Russia quickly consolidated its posi-
tions and recognized the two breakaway regions as 
independent states. 
It is tempting to conclude that, once again, Rus-
sia’s military may have acted on its own, perhaps 
in support of perceived foreign policy objectives. 
Although it is certainly too soon to form any 
conclusions about this case, there is little doubt that 
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civilians in authority over the military were eventu-
ally in control of the major events associated with 
the campaign. It is not clear, however, whether the 
pre-invasion moves represented military initiative, 
adventurism, or perhaps opportunism.
The question of military opportunism, especially 
in the context of pre-invasion provocations, looms 
large. There is mounting evidence that Russia had 
a military presence inside Georgia before the early 
morning invasion took place on August 7. It would 
have been difficult if not impossible to mount such a 
complex force in such a short period of time without 
considerable effort and a good deal of luck. 
This kind of opportunism is not without 
precedent. In the summer of 1999 two incidents 
demonstrate the same point. In June Russian military 
forces entered and occupied the airport at Pristina 
in Kosovo, almost setting off armed conflict with 
NATO forces also deployed in the region. Later that 
summer, in August, in the Northern Caucasus, the 
Russian military acted on its own to prepare the 
battle space for the events that followed, making it 
easy for politicians to choose war for the second time 
in Chechnya. The following year, also in August, 
the submarine Kursk sank in the Barents Sea taking 
the lives of all 118 men on board. Throughout this 
tragedy the navy consistently lied to the president 
about conditions at the scene and the prospects for 
recovery. The navy had been trying to stage a success-
ful torpedo shot to demonstrate its preparedness and 
expertise. What happened was a classic case of doing 
more with less—use of inferior and obsolete equip-
ment under dangerous conditions doomed the effort 
and proved to the new president that his military had 
serious problems.
As was the case when General Viktor Zavarzin 
took the initiative to enter and occupy the airport at 
Pristina in Kosovo ahead of NATO troops in June 
1999, while Boris Yeltsin’s authority waned in favor 
of his heir apparent Vladimir Putin, the military 
may have perceived gaps in civilian authority as the 
transition of presidential power shifted from Putin to 
Dmitri Medvedev in 2008. Circumstances of Medve-
dev’s election to the presidency by way of uncontested 
presidential nomination—essentially unopposed 
candidacy—and Putin’s subsequent announcement 
that he would remain in government as the prime 
minister, gave rise to questions in military circles 
about who was really in charge. Although the balance 
of presidential power in these two cases seems to be 
in opposite directions, weak to strong in 1999, strong 
to weak in 2008, perceived uncertainty of the politi-
cal transition remains plausible.
Civilian authorities might have found it hard to 
resist the chance to take advantage of the situation 
created by the military acting on its own. As the 
military shaped the political environment on its own 
initiative, the Kremlin may have simply acquiesced, 
following through with policy after the fact. If true, 
then the case of Georgia could be for Medvedev what 
the Kursk submarine tragedy was for Putin in 2000, 
a sea change that ultimately helped him to see what 
the military was really doing—lying, cheating, and 
stealing. Putin’s conception of military reform dif-
fered sharply from that of Yeltsin, whose half-hearted 
reform attempts were aimed at slimming down 
the military without transforming it. Putin always 
regarded the armed forces as not only vital guarantors 
of state security, but also symbols of the revival of a 
strong Russia.
Russia’s Contemporary Military Capabilities
The raw capabilities of Russia’s military instrument 
of power have degraded so severely that there is 
little real force to support the new security poli-
cies aimed at balancing Europe and countering the 
United States. On May 9 last year, Russia’s brand 
new president, Dmitri Medvedev, said, “The Russian 
military is rising in strength, like all of Russia.” I take 
him seriously, but I believe it will be a very long time 
before we see anything substantively new paraded on 
Victory Day in Moscow. Soaring rhetoric notwith-
standing, Russia’s military plans are a long way from 
sounding credible to anyone who has ever seen them 
up close. In a recent (2008) Center for Naval Analy-
ses publication, Dmitry Gorenburg, henry Gaffney, 
and Ken Gause have expertly documented the appall-
ing state of the Russian Navy’s current order of battle. 
As a former US Naval Attaché in Russia, I can attest 
personally to the credibility of their findings.
The last time I saw Russia’s only aircraft carrier, 
Kuznetsov, the ship was in port near Murmansk with 
her boilers pier-side for extensive repairs (visibly 
rusting in the snow and ice). There were weeds 
growing in her flight deck. The fact that she was 
recently underway, something Russia has been brag-
ging about, is a marvelous feat of naval engineering—
and probably a nightmare for her crew. If recent 
announcements are to be believed, Russia aspires to a 
fleet of 5-6 (deployable) aircraft carrier battle groups 
in a complete “modernization” of the Russian navy 
by the year 2016. This is an outrageous thing to say. 
The shipyards that build and maintain these ships 
have long since fallen into utter disrepair—in many 
cases so badly that they could not, in my opinion, 
be reconstituted without considerable expense and 
expertise. In my view, Russia is a generation away 
from building enough ships to create even one of 
these battle groups. 
As for long range bombers deploying to the 
western hemisphere—the numbers are small—two to 
be exact. Russia has only managed to build a few new 
Blackjack bombers, TU-160s, in the last several years. 
Most of the planes in Russia’s air force are Soviet era. 
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They have not been properly maintained since the fall 
of the Soviet Union and they are in poor condition 
now. Spare parts are difficult to find and new equip-
ment is simply not available. More than half of the 
aircraft in Russia’s air force are simply not opera-
tional—at all. The other half are probably risky to fly. 
I would certainly not want to fly one to Venezuela.
The submarine fleet is still credible, as the strategic 
elements of military power were maintained in good 
condition even as the rest of the military was allowed 
to decay. For years the only military personnel who 
were paid any salary at all were the submarine fleet 
sailors—beginning with the ballistic missile subs, but 
including those assigned to attack units as well. Still, 
as the Kursk tragedy in August 2000 highlighted, 
Russia’s submarines eventually met the same fate as 
everything else in the military.1 Despite building one 
new submarine, the Borey class Yuri Dolgoruki, there 
has been almost no new technology, no new research 
and development, for a very long time. The keel for 
this single new construction submarine was laid in 
1996. Twelve years in the making, there is still no 
ballistic missile ready to go that fits this submarine’s 
design. The new tests of the Bulava-M missile are 
credible, however, but it was not designed for the 
new class of SSBN. The new boat would have to be 
redesigned—cut in half and put back together—to 
accommodate Russia’s only new long-range strategic 
missile. 
As a human footnote to this tragic state of affairs, 
many, indeed if not most, of the scientists and techni-
cians who developed what was once a mighty force 
have long since died, left, or grown poor and moved 
on to other fields of work. There is not much incen-
tive today for young people to pursue careers in the 
defense industry. The truth is that Russia’s security 
sector is so riddled with problems related to its failure 
to implement reforms that its ability to secure the 
country’s defense is actually questionable. Worse, the 
military’s most senior leaders have a demonstrated 
track record of blocking reform and stifling civilian 
control.
While it is certainly possible that this could 
change, especially with potentially tremendous 
revenues from oil and gas, in an atmosphere almost 
literally fueled by political rhetoric designed to moti-
vate a nation in its desire to return to “greatness,” it 
will still be quite difficult to do and it will take a very 
long time. Although the current and ongoing global 
economic crisis has had and will continue to have a 
significant negative impact on Russia’s economy, this 
condition is not permanent and petroleum based 
income will almost certainly return to record levels at 
some point.
Medvedev represents a policy of continuity with 
the Putin regime, a conclusion that is perhaps most 
evident by Putin’s installation as prime minister on 
the day after the new president’s inauguration. Of 
course it is too soon to know if his policies will be 
very new or different with regard to military reforms. 
There have, however, been several indications of 
change. Last summer Medvedev fired General Yuri 
Baluyevskiy, Chief of the General Staff. This is 
certainly not the first example of a defense minister 
sacking a chief of the general staff, nor is it even 
particularly unusual, but in this case the move was 
based on military reform—or rather by its very poor 
progress. 
With the appointment of a little-known civilian, 
Anatoly Serdyukov, as minister of defense last year, 
emphasis shifted away from simply acquiring greater 
budgets and spending the money on big headline-
grabbing projects toward more effective management 
of the process itself. A tough financial manager whose 
background was in the tax police, Serdyukov has 
sought to minimize the wastage, embezzlement and 
inefficiency which were holding back reform. Serdyu-
kov is bitterly disliked by senior military leaders. 
Speaking to journalists in a Moscow press conference, 
retired General Leonid Ivashov, a hard-line conserva-
tive who remains influential as a defense intellectual 
and advisor to the government, commented on 
Serdyukov’s appointment: “until recently the army 
was in shock, now it is in mourning.”
Serdyukov has proved surprisingly effective, but at 
the same time has not yet sought to address the basic 
doctrinal dilemma, that Russia’s armed forces remain 
first and foremost built around the needs of project-
ing great power status worldwide and fighting wars 
unlikely ever to happen. Serdyukov and Baluyevskiy 
fought over several specific areas—all directly related 
to reform initiatives:
•	 Civilians	assigned	to	implement	reforms	from	
inside the general staff—a move seen as a direct 
challenge to the authority of senior military 
leaders
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1 In November 2008, an Akula II class attack submarine 
(K-152 Nerpa) experienced a severe casualty during Pacific 
Fleet sea trials, resulting in more than 20 dead and an equal 
number injured. The Russian press reported the incident 
widely, calling the submarine a new design equipped with the 
most modern technology, attributing the accident to human 
error involving a fire extinguisher system. In fact, this sub was 
initially built in 1991 at a shipyard on the Amur River in the 
Russian Far East. Construction was eventually halted, as was 
the case for almost every other military project at that time. 
There is no new technology in the design, and sea trials were 
more likely wishful thinking aimed at proving the submarine’s 
utility and future marketability. Reportedly, the unit was 
earmarked for lease to India, a notion that has subsequently 
been scrapped. Since then, the Russian Navy has announced 
the sub will be commissioned and placed into fleet service. 
This decision is probably hazardous business for a fleet already 
severely at risk.
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•	 Shifting	military	infrastructure—in	particular	an	
unpopular proposal to relocate the navy’s head-
quarters command from Moscow to St. Petersburg
•	 Replacing	a	number	of	military	positions	with	
civilians in professional jobs such as doctors, 
lawyers, judges, and journalists
But in the end, in each of these recent cases, the 
civilian minister of defense came out on top, and 
that is one significant measure of success in the field 
of defense reform. Respected independent military 
affairs journalist and author Alexander Golts gets 
it exactly right in his remarks carried by Moscow 
newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta last year: “absent real 
change in the mentality of Russia’s general officers 
we can expect little change in the way of meaningful 
military reform. Money is not the problem. however, 
Russia is spending it like it was 20 years ago. We need 
to change the mentality of Russia’s top brass. Other-
wise, the Russian Army will remain the Red Army.”
The Transatlantic Alliance and 
Russia’s New Strategic Vision
Strategy of course rides on the back of resources. 
Europe’s willingness to use its military instrument of 
power may be perceived as less than robust but no 
one questions the strength of the transatlantic alli-
ance, it is solid and Russia knows this. Of course both 
sides have challenges. Europe is dealing with a new 
American presidential administration, one with many 
of the same security goals as has been the case, thus 
forcing Europe to make tough choices about security 
priorities. Russia’s military force is still in a general 
state of decay, but the state is apparently not reluctant 
to demonstrate the utility of its military instrument 
in support of foreign policy. Demographic factors 
pose a significant challenge to Russian planners. 
Whether or not there will be sufficient manpower to 
back up the new strategic vision is a real question and 
there is considerable reason to doubt.
Now Russia is hailing the potential advantages of 
a new international security alliance—one that would 
stretch from “Vancouver to Vladivostok.” Sweep-
ing in its prose, but severely lacking in credibility, 
the proposal calls for a new organization that would 
eventually replace the old order. What Russia wants is 
a new transatlantic-Eurasian alliance in which it has 
the same rights and benefits as every other member. 
Russia believes the old order is dying out, that 
Europe and the United States are becoming increas-
ingly overwhelmed with problems and less capable of 
finding ways to cope inside the context of the current 
international security architecture.
Many security experts in Russia believe the 
transatlantic alliance is splitting apart and becoming 
ever thinner and less coherent, especially in the case 
of NATO as a security entity. This sour perception is 
not the least of the problems in Russia’s relations with 
the “old” West. Impediments to Russia’s relationship 
with Europe and America are almost too numerous 
to list, but none is more visceral than missile defense. 
Russia’s response to US plans to deploy missile 
defense sites in Europe, in countries that used to be 
Russia’s allies but are now seen as enemies, has been 
consistently negative. According to recent statements 
by numerous general officers, presumably speaking 
with the authority of the Ministry of Defense, Russia 
is developing new missiles to “eliminate the threat 
of missile defense.” Arguments that European and 
American interests require defense against poten-
tial threats from rogue states such as Iran have not 
managed to influence Russia’s point of view that these 
missile defense sites really are defensive.
The military in Russia is old and ill equipped—
soldiers are poorly trained and leadership is incom-
petent. One of Russia’s most well known and highly 
regarded security experts, Alexei Arbatov, currently at 
the Moscow Carnegie Center and formerly a Deputy 
on the Defense Committee of the State Duma, speak-
ing recently about the performance of the Russian 
Army in the August war with Georgia, said: “there is 
no political leadership over military organization, nor 
is there any democratic control.” It takes a long time 
and considerable planning to stage a military opera-
tion of the scope and scale Russia deployed through 
the Roki Tunnel into Georgia on August 7th, not a 
matter of hours in response to Georgia’s rash attacks 
on Russian peacekeepers as the government claims. 
Regardless of whether evidence that the war was 
planned well in advance of any provocation is cred-
ible or not, it is difficult to rule out the compelling 
possibility that the military acted on its own. Perceiv-
ing political uncertainty—Putin was in Beijing at 
the Olympics while Medvedev was on a Volga River 
cruise—the military responded to what it called a 
self-defense situation. This has happened before and, 
until something changes in the way Russia practices 
civilian control over the military, it will happen again. 
Thomas Gomart of the French Institute for 
International Relations (IFRI) sums up the situation 
with three conclusions published recently (July 2008) 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS): first, Russia is returning to global politics 
and to the global economy; second, Atlanticism is 
over and Russia intends to equal the US and EU as 
a global player; and third, Russia wants to establish 
new international consortiums, especially in the field 
of energy.
By some measures Russia is a serious contender 
in the realm of international security, by others it is 
merely a faded memory of its former state. Russia 
is not a super-power, quite the contrary. Russia is 
by no measure the equal of the United States or 
of Europe. It will be a generation before Russia’s 
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military instrument of power is capable of backing 
up its foreign and security policy aspirations. Russia 
is not a world power with “global interests and global 
reach,” as is the case with the United States. It is, 
however, entirely capable, and apparently willing, to 
exercise considerable military pressure in the region 
it has begun calling its privileged sphere of interest, 
formerly known as the near abroad. There will be 
more trouble in Russia’s back yard—and it is a really 
big back yard. But Russia has one valid point that the 
West must consider carefully: current international 
security organizations fall short of providing an 
adequate forum for debate and cooperation. Russia 
intends to balance American and European power 
in every way it can—and energy may be the new 
cold war.
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